Author: Catalina Amador (Bogota, Colombia)
The Colombian conflict has been a 52-year conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC and the government (Human Rights Watch, 2020). It is a complex conflict with diverse actors: criminal and paramilitary groups, civilians, the state, that are tangled in a web of historical claims of rights and equality, illegal economies, and a fragmented democracy since independence. For the length and complexity of the conflict one way it can be understood is as a Protracted Conflict: "hostile interactions which extend over long periods with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity", involving the whole society and defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity (Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, 1978, p. 50), and as Policinski and Kuzmanovic (2019, p. 965), point out, it has progressively become normalized, with scenarios as growing-up with the sounds of explosions, displaced families and neighbors and difficulties to fulfill basic needs like water or food.
Even though the conflict has come to an end, at least in the paper, with the peace accord in 2016 (Human Rights Watch, 2020), this highlights the need to provide security to victims of the conflict, and individuals that have been targeted during the war with security guarantees and the fight against those responsible for violent acts against human rights defenders and political and social movements (Poder legislativo, 2016, p. 8) and actions and violence since the signing directed towards these individuals demanding changes in their territories and the restitution of their land, particularly by the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC dissidents, and paramilitary successor groups (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The insufficient measures taken by the government to be able to offer them protection have brought to light the difficulties of achieving a definite end of the war and of the period of transitional justice and the problems that remain in society because of the nature of the conflict, even after the peace agreement. Nevertheless, this violence has not started with the conflict, but as Ávila (2020) argues, is part of the democratic process and structure of the state. Therefore, this essay will concentrate on some general aspects of the violence against community leaders, particularly on victims, perpetrators, characteristics of violence, and state action as an expression of the democracy of the state and the difficulties of the post-settlement society.
These violence actions are an example of what Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs (2010, 381) characterize in their peace triangle for post-settlement societies as insecure peace, where there is insecurity for the population as a result of widespread violent crimes after the end of the war, caused by the legacy of the war, with paramilitary forces and social polarization. Due to this, it is useful to know the general reasons for this violence against leaders, as the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (cited in Ávila, 2020, p. 128) describe:
"Opposition to activities linked to illegal economies; promotion of voluntary substitution of illicit crops; recognition and effective enjoyment of the rights of the victims; recognition and satisfaction of ethnic, territorial and cultural rights; promotion of the participation of alternative political sector and/or communities that have been historically consigned in public decision-making bodies and land claims are the main causes."
This permits us to see the idea of the systematization of violence, not in the perpetrators but in the victims who have similar characteristics and have been historically in the same zones (Ávila, 2020, p. 15).
Likewise, is imperative to make a general description of the material actors of these violent actions, including Paramilitary groups, ELN (National Liberation Army), FARC dissident groups, public force, unknown, and others. According to Somos Defensores (2021, p. 99), a protection space formed by non-governmental organizations for human rights to prevent aggressions and protect the lives of human rights advocates, 2020 the number of assassinations was 199, from these 124 were allegedly committed by unknown actors, which are made up by private security forces and hitmen. The first ones can be understood as the result of "recycle wars", in which the conflict and the illegal economies leave a reserve criminal army, that offers services of private security, and is being contracted by legal and illegal actors (Ávila, 2020, p. 119). 30 of these actions were from paramilitary groups, 25 from FARC dissidents, 9 from ELN, 8 from the public force, and 3 from others.
The violence against these leaders needs to be understood not only as a part of the conflict but as part of the democratic system in Colombia, as described by López (2021, p. 88), the assassination of these individuals continues the tradition of instrumentalization of death to eliminate political counterparts that try to establish different relations in and with other territories. The instrumentalization can be seen in the different phases of these violent actions that are on display in diverse territories of the country expressed by Ávila (2020, p. 16-17). The first is characterized by generalized violence where there are high levels of homicides, massacres, and forced displacement, which can last a few years, an example is the Bajo Cauca territory in Antioquia, a department in the country. The second phase shows selective violence, in what appears to be pacific territories, but in reality, the political structures have already started a process of consolidation of a specific and beneficial image, that lower the generalized violence level and is illustrated in the Urabá region from the departments of Antioquia and Choco. Finally, in the third one, there is the existence of authoritarianism: no opposition, low levels of generalizing and selective violence and the political class in control don't have judicial constraints, but where if civilians do not stay in the margins of the image they have created, the result would be death or displacement, as in the Caribbean coast.
When we concentrated in the geographical areas of violence, as described by Ávila (2020, p. 20-21), two different scenarios open: the post-conflict zones with the re-accommodating of forces and zones that do not have this history, important in the long run, showing this problem as part of the history of the country not only during the armed conflict. In the first one, there is a void of power left by FARC, later fill by "new illegal armed groups", to further their economic gain with illegal actives like drug trafficking (Nocua, 2019, p. 152). As seen in the report for Latin America from the International Crisis Group (2021), these zones have a higher control place by the illegal armed groups, that firstly seize control often by violence and secondly impose laws and rules on the entire population to assure the completion of their illegal activities. There is as well a poor institutional presence, which fails to satisfy the political and rights needs of the population, and the militarization approach taken by the government have not been effective in deterrent or stopping the violence but have raised the number of assassinations (Nocua, 2019, p. 160).
In these zones, there is another layer that was added by the peace agreement: the new position in which the local powers found themselves, seeing at risk their economic and political interests. This is because of the reforms that the peace agreement brought to the table and having, as a result, opposition to the accord, and even the promotion of violence to intimidate the community leaders who advance these changes (Nocua, 2019, p. 152). Additionally, as there is a restriction in the law of justice and peace, the model of transitional justice propose after the peace negotiations with paramilitary groups (Autodefensa Unidas de Colombia) and in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the judicial organ for transitional peace after the 2016 peace agreement, to judge these responsible third parties (elites, businessman and landowners) for human rights violations (Nocua, 2019, p. 152), limiting the rights of the victims, the consequences that the perpetrators face for their actions and the democratic process in these areas, been influence by the local powers in control.
Moreover, another part to consider is the role and action of the government in these events. Ávila (2020, p. 229-230), recognize four big conclusions for their involvement. The first refers to actions that have been taken to protect their lives, many by recommendations of social organizations, but with little real impact. An example is the National Commission for Security guarantees created during the second term (2014-2018) of Juan Manuel Santos's presidency. The second concentrates on the two faces of the state: the first one on the national level showing concern about the security of the leaders and the second one on the local level, being indifferent toward the victims and complacent with criminals (Ávila, 2020, p. 230). The third one refers to the change in mandate between presidents Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and Ivan Duque (2018-2022), and the setback of what has been already achieved in Santos's period, with the Early Action Plan for prevention and protection created in Duque´s term. Finally, one of the biggest problems from the stateside is the low level of judicialization of the material and intellectual perpetrators of violent action, violating the rights of victims, this issue can be understood with the concept of unjust peace by Höglund, and Söderberg Kovacs (2010, 383), in where impunity culture and lack of reconciliation can threaten the peace that is trying to be achieved, and as López (2021, p. 84) describes impunity is a part of our system of social relations.
Finally, the polarized peace characterizes by Höglund, and Söderberg Kovacs (2010, 382), where conflict attitudes are polarized since the agreement and even more extreme political views can manifest in the post-war period, endangering the peacebuilding process, can also be seen in the country. This polarized climate that has been growing in Colombia, because of historical inequalities on economic, political, and social aspects due to status, race, gender, and religion; and the hate speech against the action of community leaders have made a more viable environment for violence in the country, as Nocua (2019, p. 160) describes. Labeling the political and social actions of the counterpart as illegitimate and allowing only one way of thinking as the right one, while proposing only one way to supposedly achieve common welfare, secretly hiding their own individual interest (Nocua,2019, p. 160). Been illustrated by the win of the "No" in the referendum for the peace agreement in 2016 and the electoral campaigns before the election of the president and Congress, utilizing "false news, demonization of the counterpart and rising resentment" (Nocua, 2019, p. 162) to defeat any alternative views that could provoke a political and social change of the status quo.
Unfortunately, as seen on these pages the historical divisions and discrimination of certain groups of the population in Colombia have amounted to an armed conflict of decades and ongoing expressions of violence affecting civilian population from every actor in the country: criminal groups, contracted private security groups, paramilitaries, dissident groups from FARC and the state. An even when negotiation and agreements have been reached with some of these groups, since the discrimination and division are rooted in the structure and way of functioning of the political process and democracy of the country, only after these have been addressed the population would be able to start seeing a real environment of peace and needed reconstruction of the state.
Resources
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