Author: Emma Potchapornkul
Thailand’s southern border provinces have been the site of a little-known ethno-political conflict rooted in a centuries old contestation between the historical Siamese Kingdom and the Sultanate of Patani. Since the conflict’s re-emergence in 2004, more than 21,000 incidents have taken place with some 7,200 people killed and 13,500 injured (Deep South Watch, 2021). Efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict have, so far, failed. This essay draws on the concept of counter-peace to explain why these efforts have yet to yield any positive outcomes. It starts with a discussion of the counter-peace concept before providing an overview of the conflict. It then details the main blockages in the region’s peace process moving through the international, national, and grassroots levels. This essay draws predominantly on existing literature on the southern conflict and on Thailand’s socio-political development from the 20th Century onwards to inform its analysis. This is supplemented with data drawn from government policy documents and civil society reports.
What is Counter-Peace
The concept of counter-peace is a recent contribution to a well-established canon that has sought to challenge and critique the liberal paradigm that has dominated international conflict resolution approaches since the end of the Cold War. It takes its inspiration from analyses of the dialectically-related revolution and counterrevolution which, according to Pogodda and Richmond and Visoka, "most clearly analyses how actors try to erode, contain or eliminate emancipatory agency" (n.d. p. 5) for the purpose of preserving order, stability, and the status quo. Counter-peace refers to the myriad ways in which attempts to create a positive peace are opposed, obstructed, and undermined.
The counter-peace has many parallels to the concept of “illiberal peacebuilding”, which refers to a conflict management approach that diverges substantially from norms of liberal peacebuilding as regime security and stability is prioritised over accountability, human rights and social inclusion (Smith et al., 2020 p.4). The tactics in the counter-peace toolbox - not dissimilar to the tactics employed in the service of illiberal peacebuilding - are considered most effective if they constitute more subtle or indirect acts aimed at blocking change. Particularly relevant is the way in which state institutions are captured by elites and their criminal networks as this enables those elites to subvert and co-opt the state formation process, thus creating a more durable counter-peace (Visoka, 2020 p.435).
By incorporating the issue of power dynamics in its analysis, the counter-peace concept also draws on the concept of friction in peacebuilding, which has been deployed to explore the interplay between global ideas, discourses and practices as they encounter diverse local realities. In developing this idea of friction, Björkdahl & Höglund (2013) outline a six-point typology of “encounters” that range from compliance at one end of the spectrum to rejection at the other. The encounter most relevant to the counter-peace, however, is co-option, which they define as the “strategic adoption of the global/external into the local as a means of averting pressure” (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013 p.297). In keeping with this theme, Haberkorn has argued that Thailand’s local contextualisation of liberal democratic notions of law, human rights, and justice was a “process of collision and transformation” (Haberkom, 2018 pp. 14-15), which, counterproductively, ended up reinforcing long-standing traditions of ruler and ruled. She proposes that the Thai state consciously decided to make human rights the site of contention and struggle and she shows how officials have actively taken up and manipulated human rights discourse to legitimise and cover up state violence.
What the concept of counter-peace adds to these discussions is an explanation as to why liberal peacebuilding interventions have, overall, been unsuccessful. The argument put forward is that if state institutions have been co-opted by counter-peace elites, it is these elites that foreign governments are then obliged to engage and work with. This means that international aid and liberal peacebuilding interventions inadvertently end up strengthening counter-peace forces (Pogodda and Richmond and Visoka, in publication p.6). At the same time, liberal peacebuilding’s parallel focus on funding civil society projects to deal with the manifold issues emerging alongside violent conflict fails to recognise that civil society, particularly if fragmented, simply cannot compete with counter-peace alliances. The reason for liberal peacebuilding’s myopia is that scant regard has been given to the role and influence of power relations and dynamics. Thus, liberal peacebuilding has overburdened weak civil society networks with too many responsibilities and unrealistic expectations about what they can achieve, particularly when confronting the reality of global realpolitik and how it conditions international support. The outcome has been the proliferation of frozen or stalemated conflicts (Pogodda and Richmond and Visoka, in publication).
Overview of Southern Conflict and Dialogue Process
The conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces is driven by grievances amongst the majority Malay-Muslim community as well as by cycles of violence and counter-violence. Between 2004 and 2012, the Thai state’s approach to quelling the violence focused primarily on counterinsurgency and development. The military, especially, opposed a formal peace process in fear such a move could elevate the status of insurgents and internationalise the conflict. The issue was, therefore, kept internal.
The 2013 public launch of a peace dialogue process by the Yingluck Shinawatra government departed from the Thai state’s conventional approach. Kuala Lumpur acted as facilitator at the Thai government’s request. The region’s main armed resistance group, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), participated only at the behest of Malaysia. Nevertheless, the group issued five demands, including a call for international observers and the recognition of sovereign rights for Malay-Muslims over the Patani land. Despite its failings, the process pushed BRN to reveal itself publicly and begin communicating with the general public through mainstream and social media.
Following the 2014 military coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) continued with the peace dialogue. The BRN refused to participate in peace talks under a military regime, so Mara Patani—an umbrella organisation of mainly Malaysia-based exiled separatists—took its place as dialogue partner. However, Mara Patani suffered a severe legitimacy deficit due to its seeming lack of command and control over the rank and file.
With no tangible progress made under the NCPO, a new phase of peace dialogue began in 2020 after it emerged that discreet backchannel talks with the BRN had been going on for at least a year. The Thai dialogue panel met BRN representatives in Kuala Lumpur for the first time in January 2020 and international observers were allowed to attend the peace talks in a personal capacity. The renewed peace talks were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and have been on hold since then.
International Blockages to Peace
Foreign Aid and the International Peace Architecture
The historical antecedents to the current blockages to peace lie partly in the way foreign aid was disbursed in Thailand over the course of the mid-20th Century onwards. Specifically, the inability of foreign aid programmes across Thailand to acknowledge horizontal and other inequalities exacerbated local conflict dynamics. Burke’s thesis on foreign aid and peripheral conflict (2012) describes how foreign aid funded negatively-perceived national development initiatives because these funds were channelled mainly through Bangkok, whose development approach was intimately tied to its assimilationist nation-building project. (Burke, 2012 p.147). In particular, development and poverty eradication projects have been geared towards fostering loyalty to the monarchy (Chalermsripinyorat, 2020 p.77).
Since the resumption of violence in 2004, key donors of the international peace architecture have largely bypassed the Deep South, largely due to donors’ desire to maintain diplomatic relations and their inability to challenge recipient sovereignty. The few donors that have attempted to address the structural roots of the southern conflict through small scale funding programmes have had their efforts blocked by the Thai state. In the Deep South, donors have rarely been allowed to approach sensitive issues seen as relating to national identity or sovereignty (Burke, 2012 p.148). In 2019, the Thai government refused to accept US$1.8 million from the UN, which would have been distributed to different UN agencies to work on peacebuilding in Southern Thailand (personal communication with UN official, September 2021). Ultimately, the international peace architecture has only lightly touched the conflict-affected south as internationally-supported peacebuilding measures remain thin on the ground. Thus, the protracted dependency on external aid or intervention that is said to be characteristic of conflicts in stalemate is not applicable to the Southern Thailand case.
International Counter-Peace Architecture
A much discussed topic in policy circles has been the democratic regression that has occurred in many Southeast Asian countries (Parameswaran, 2020), with Myanmar being the most recent example. It is recognised that the phenomenon affects not only domestic politics but has a spillover effect on other countries in the region. Particularly important in this context, however, is whether it is indicative of an emerging international counter-peace architecture. In this vein, it could be argued that the inter-governmental entity, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), displays some core elements of the counter-peace. The body’s doctrine of noninterference in a member states’ internal affairs, known as the “ASEAN way”, is frequently said to undermine regional human rights promotion and protection. For example, ASEAN ministers have stuck rigidly to the ASEAN way and avoided releasing any official statements on Thailand’s southern conflict (Rupprecht, 2014). Moreover, despite the 2009 inauguration of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the 2012 promulgation of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, there has been a notable “mismatch between these declaratory goals and realities on the ground” (Langlois, 2021). The body’s adoption of the rhetoric of human rights could be viewed as an elite measure aimed at buffering themselves against domestic and international pressure. In other words, ASEAN’s establishment of human rights commissions and declarations may simply be a “watered-down” political response to regional civil society’s vociferous human rights advocacy.
Another element of the international counter-peace architecture might be termed authoritarian capacity building, a process whereby governments share, learn, and exchange best practices with a view to countering emancipatory agents in society. For example, signs of Thailand’s “creeping digital authoritarianism” have led some observers to speculate as to whether direct Chinese support has been given as Thailand seeks to achieve the level of control it has over the geographical space of the Deep South in the digital sphere (McDermott, 2021). Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has drawn closer to China in all areas and has complied with Beijing’s requests to extradite Chinese dissidents (Ganjanakhundee, 2020). Moreover, since Myanmar’s coup and subsequent crackdown on its citizens, there have been reports that Myanmar’s coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has sought advice from Gen. Prayut on how to build a democratic facade (Samet, 2021). Although establishing the veracity of such communications poses a considerable challenge, it is possible to see a pattern of similar tactics employed across the region by several authoritarian governments and with respect to the counter-peace, the question of direct influence is less important here than the existence of any influence at all.
National Blockages to Peace
Competitive Authoritarianism
Within Thailand, the entrenchment of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010) represents a victory for the country’s traditionalist network of monarchised-military elites (Chambers & Waitoolkiat 2016), who have successfully manipulated the country’s democratic institutions to handicap opponents and cement their power. Following the 2014 coup, significant changes were made to the constitutional and legal framework. These changes culminated in 2017 with the enactment of Thailand’s 20th Constitution. Two years later, an election was held in an environment that enabled pro-regime institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Election Commission (EC) to exploit legal mechanisms to undercut opposition parties and ensure that Gen. Prayut could continue as Prime Minister for another term. The ideological underpinnings that drive this network of elites is the maintenance of Thailand’s traditional order with the king at the helm. The 1932 coup that led to Thailand’s transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy spawned a “protracted struggle between the old order and the new” (Baker & Pongphaichit, p.119), which drives a repetitive cycle of socio-political instability, coups and new constitutions. This cycle is testament to the country’s failure to create a resilient national social contract and efforts to upend the existing conservative social hierarchy and establish a new social contract have proved incredibly challenging. This unwillingness to countenance an alternative and broader conception of the Thai polity poses a significant blockage to southern peace, which depends on a fundamental transformation of the relationship between the centre and the periphery.
Discourse Manipulation
Recalling the fact that counter-peace is said to be most effective when it represents more water-downed alternatives to peace (Pogodda & Richmond & Visoka, unpublished p.5), another point worth mentioning is the manipulation of discourses as a primary counter-peace manoeuvre. Discourse, as a social practice, is multifaceted; just as it can promote and uphold certain ideologies, it can also be an effective form of dissemblance. Thailand’s counter-peace elites are particularly adept at this double-speak. Comparison of the Thai government’s information materials on the southern dialogue process reveal subtle differences between the English and Thai language versions. In particular, the former has evolved over the years such that it now incorporates more progressive terms and concepts related to the language of conflict transformation that would be more amenable to an international audience. Since 2016, when ISOC held its first press conference at the western-media oriented Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT), usage of terms such as “inclusivity”, “safety zone”, and “common space” have all been deployed. However, these terms have acted as empty signifiers that can be filled with meaning according to the interpretation of the receiver in accordance with the concept of constructive ambiguity. In a 2020 press release, it was affirmed that “a sustainable dialogue process requires participation and support from all sectors.” However, the peace dialogue process remains a steadfastly un-inclusive process. Moreover, state-initiated “consultations” continue to be roundly criticised by civil society for the lack of any actual consultation. By contrast, Thai language press materials adopt a more conservative tone that typically downplays the status of their interlocutors, for example by habitually adopting the euphemistic nomenclature of “those who hold different views from the state” or referring to the southern conflict as “the southern problem” and emphasising conflict containment over transformation. One must wonder whether donor-funded exchange trips organised for state officials to learn about peace processes in other contexts has made state officials more adept at employing certain discourses in certain contexts and to certain audiences. Thus, those western countries that may take an interest in the southern conflict and enquire as to the current situation, possibly at the behest of international human rights NGOs, can be engaged with and placated through the mutual intelligibility of a common discourse. Yet, such discourse need only be deployed in communications with this particular audience. The ASEAN way, for example, would preclude such a conversation from occurring. Ultimately, such dissemblance has allowed the Thai state to communicate different messages to a domestic audience and to an international audience.
Grassroots Blockages to Peace
Authoritarian Civil Society
Thailand’s elites are supported by a wider grassroots counter-peace movement, dubbed by Sombatpoonsiri (2021) as authoritarian civil society (ACS). She documents the rise of ACS groups since the 2019 election and notes how their actions have overlapped with and complemented state measures to silence dissidents. The popular practice of Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPP) has been combined with digital surveillance to stifle critics through multiple legal charges using laws against lèse–majesté, computer crimes, sedition, and defamation. One example demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between top-down and bottom-up forms of counter-peace: an ACS group demanded the EC dissolve all seven opposition parties for violating a constitutional provision by participating in a highly politically-charged public forum. Although the EC did not take up the complaint, the military’s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) lodged a sedition charge against 12 opposition party leaders, academics and activists. The offending topic during the forum had been a discussion on resolving the southern conflict that made reference to amending Section 1 of the Constitution that states that “Thailand is one and indivisible kingdom”. The activism of what Sombatpoonsiri refers to as “organic” ACS groups reflects the country’s ideological polarisation. These groups reinforce royalist-nationalist discourses and monitor online opinions hostile to traditional elites. Online surveillance and social media content manipulation has become a prevalent counter-peace tactic. The ACS’s anti-democratic practices contribute to the expansion of a counter-peace architecture that seeks to eliminate emancipatory agency with a view to preserving their preferred political order. Thus, we see how conservative nationalist discourses bridge class divides joining counter-peace elites and their mass base.
Fragmented Civil Society
By contrast, non-authoritarian civil society struggles with elite and grassroots nationalism as represented by the monarchised-military elite and the ACS respectively in a society of increasing economic inequality. In addition to the heavy restrictions on freedom of expression, the Thai state has sought to control non-authoritarian civil society through the enactment of a law on NGO registration that would negatively impact those joining together to advocate for human rights. Civil society in the Deep South is already weakened by a lack of resources arising from the state’s restrictions on international funding and in 2018, the allocation of THB 50 million (US$1.49 million) of state funds to support local CSOs sparked a rift that further factionalised civil society. Those who accepted government funding were seen as state lackeys and were discredited. Some organisations even split over the funding disagreement. However, just as liberal peacebuilding has overburdened civil society with unrealistic expectations as to what it can achieve, so some segments of local civil society have naively overestimated the extent to which the international peace architecture is able or willing to assist them in their goal of realising a positive peace for the region.
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to provide a preliminary analysis of the counter-peace forces that have interacted to create a limited counter-peace whereby the southern conflict remains contained rather than resolved. In trying to understand how counter-peace forces may add up to an overall counter-peace architecture, a systemic view of the conflict situation based on broad parameters that extend from the international down to the grassroots is vital. One benefit of adopting a systemic perspective is that it can capture the self-reproducing character - in essence, the intractability - of long-standing conflicts due to its focus on the interaction and interdependence of the variables and linkages between them (Ropers, p.30).
Using this systemic lens, I’ve identified some notable counter-peace actors both at the elite and grassroots level and commented on roles played by civil society and the international donor community. I have also incorporated an institutional perspective by examining the institutional changes that were made in Thailand after the 2014 coup. Furthermore, I have explored the ideological underpinnings that connect these various elements and how the use of discourse has been artfully deployed to different audiences as a counter-peace tactic. A noticeable lacunae has been discussion of the role of the armed resistance movements. Nevertheless, this paper has highlighted how the southern conflict’s blockages to peace are intimately tied to Thailand’s failed attempt to create a resilient national social contract. Thus, peace in the south remains a distant possibility until Thailand’s national blockages are addressed once and for all.
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